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Abstract—The IEEE 802.11i standard has been designed to
enhance security in wireless networks. In the 4-way handshake
the supplicant and the authenticator use the pairwise master
key (PMK) to derive a fresh pairwise transient key (PTK).
The PMK is not used directly for security while assuming the
supplicant and authenticator have the same PMK before running
4-way handshake. In this paper, the 4-way handshake phase has
been analysed using Isabelle tool to identify a new Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attack. The attack prevents the authenticator from
receiving message 4 after the supplicant sends it out. This attack
forces the authenticator to re-send the message 3 until time out
and subsequently to de-authenticate supplicant. This paper has
proposed improvements to the 4-way handshake to avoid the
Denial-of-Service attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the great challenges for wireless environments is
to provide enough strong protection to the data packages
exchanged over WLANs. Eavesdropping attacks can be con-
ducted in WLANs by potential attackers with little effort and
suitable radio receivers. So attackers can attack a WLAN
with difficult detection or prevention [1]. The wired equivalent
privacy protocol (WEP) has been the first attempt proposed to
protect the data packages exchanged over WLANs. However,
WEP does not provide strong protection to the data packages
exchanged over WLANs, especially in the encryption. In June
2004, the IEEE task group i developed a new standard called
802.11i to avoid the weaknesses in WEP and to enhance
confidentiality, integrity and mutual authentication [2, 3].
The 802.11i standard involves three entities called sup-
plicant (wireless device), authenticator (access point) and
authentication server. All six phases of the 802.11i standard
are important to achieve authentication, especially for the 4-
way handshake. The 4-way handshake aims to establish a fresh
session key between the access point and the wireless device.
There are three tasks for the access point and the wireless
device to achieve successfully in the 4-way handshake phase.
Firstly, establish random nonces to verify the liveness of each
other. Then, confirm the existence of the PMK at the access
point and the wireless device. Finally, generate the group
transient key (GTK) by the access point and transfer the GTK
to the wireless device [4].
The 4-way handshake can be analysed using linear temporal
logic. Alabdulatif et al. have proposed a framework which
can be used to investigate and analyse the 4-way handshake
[5, 6]. This framework can be classified as a theorem proving
method, which is used to analyse all possible behaviours of
a protocol to ensure they meet a set of correctness conditions
[7]. There are a number of general rules and assumptions in
the framework that can be used to analyse many protocols.
Isabelle is one of the tools that can be used to implement the
framework and to analyse protocols. In this paper, we identify
a DoS attack in the 4-way handshake, which prevents message
4 from being received by the access point. Then the access
point will re-send message 3 to obtain message 4, but to no
avail. All resent messages will be discarded by the wireless
device.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section II
introduces the IEEE802.11i standrad and the 4-way handshake
phase. In section III, the framework is adjusted for analysing
the 4-way handshake using Isabelle and proving basic proper-
ties. Section IV explains in detail the DoS attack and how to
fix it in the 4-way handshake on massage 4. The conclusion
and future work are in section V.
II. IEEE802.11I STANDARD
The 802.11i standard has six sequential phases to achieve
authentication among the authentication server, the authentica-
tor (access point) and the supplicant (wireless device). In each
phase there are some tasks that should be achieved successfully
to meet the security target of the phase. The success of
authentication means the wireless device and the access point
are identified and verified by each other and a secret key is
established for exchanging encrypted data over WLANs. The
authentication procedure consists of six phases as follows:
a) discover phase, b) authentication and association phase, c)
EAP/802.1x/RADIUS authentication, d) 4-way handshake, e)
group key handshake, f) secure data communication [8].
A. The 4-Way Handshake Phase
The 4-way handshake is essential in the IEEE 802.11i
protocol, aiming to verify that the access point is legitimate
to generate the PMK. The wireless device may request to
run the 4-way handshake protocol or the access point may
start by itself. Figure 1 shows that the 4-way handshake
exchanges messages at abstract level, where AA and SPN
represent the MAC address of the access point and wireless
device, respectively. SNonce represents the access point nonce
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and ANonce represents the nonce of the wireless device. The
msg1, 2, 3, 4 refer to several message types; sn is sequence
number. MICPTK {} refers to the Message Integrity Code
(MIC) that uses the fresh PTK to calculate the integrity code of
contents between the braces. MIC is used instead of Message
Authentication Code (MAC) for cryptography because the
meaning of MAC in network is medium access control [9].
The access point and wireless device assume that both have
the same PMK before running the 4-way handshake. The
PMK is not used for any security operation directly; instead
it is used to infer the PTK through pseudo random function
with result length X as follow:
PTK = PRF-X(PMK, Pairwise key expansion || Min
{AA,SPA} ||Max {AA,SPA} ||Min {ANonce, SNone} ||
Max {ANonce, SNone})
The fresh PTK is divided into three keys. The first key
is the Key Confirmation Key (KCK), which is only used to
calculate MIC. The second key is the Key Encryption Key
(KEK) and the third key is the Temporary Key (TK). The
KEK and TK are not used in the authentication process, so
they will be ignored in this paper [10].
 AA, ANonce, sn, Msg1 
SPA, SNonce, sn, Msg2, MIC PTK { SNonce,  
sn, Msg2} 
SPA, sn+1, Msg4, MIC PTK{ sn+1, Msg4} 
 AA, ANonce, sn+1, Msg3, MIC PTK { ANonce, 
sn+1, Msg3} 
Wireless devices Access point  
Derive (PTK) 
Derive (PTK) 
Verify MIC 
Verify ANonce 
Verify SNonce 
Verify MIC 
Install (PTK) 
Update sn 
Install (PTK) 
Update sn 
Figure 1. The 4-way Handshake
The wireless device and the access point can discard a
message in the 4-way handshake when receiving a message
with unexpected sequence number or invalid MIC. Message 1
is unacceptable for the wireless device when it is received after
the time interval of successful 802.11i authentication. In this
case, the wireless device tries to authenticate with same access
point or another one after disassociating and de-authenticating
the current access point. On the other side, if the access point
has not received a message before time out then it will re-send
within configured time intervals. Moreover, the access point
will de-authenticate the wireless device if it has never received
any reply from the wireless device [9].
III. A FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTED IN ISABELLE
Isabelle tool is widely used to reason a formal system based
on higher order logic. Bella defined Isabelle tool as “a generic,
interactive theorem prover” [11]. Isabelle provides a high level
automation, which means human intervention required is lower
than many other tools. Paulson is one of the researchers who
have used Isabelle to prove the correctness of a number of
protocols, such as the internet protocol TLS [12]. In this
paper, Isabelle is used to analyse the 4-way handshake prase
of 802.11i standard.
A. Framework for Analysing Protocols Using Linear Temporal
Logic
Isabelle can be used to verify and prove the correctness of
security protocols. Four steps are followed to analyse protocols
using Isabelle tool. First, adjust the framework slightly for the
protocol to be verified. The reason is that the framework is a
template and requires to accommodate the minor differences
amongst various security protocols. Then, model the protocol
steps by rewriting the protocol to make it compatible with
the language used in the framework. After that, prove basic
and essential properties of the protocol, which can be reused
for other protocols. Finally, prove security properties of the
protocol based on the proof of the basic properties mentioned
above. In the next section, we will follow these steps and
analyse the 4-way handshake stage using the framework
proposed by Alabdulatif et al [5, 6].
B. Framework Adjustment
The framework requires a slight amendment to be
appropriate for analysing the 4-way handshake protocol. The
access point AP and the wireless device SP are honest
agents and the attacker here is called Spy. Also, the trusted
third party is TTP . The definition of agent will be modified
as:
datatype agent = SP | AP | Spy | TTP
Similarly, four new nonces are used in the 4-way handshake,
with SN and SN1 representing the sequence number and the
sequence number +1, respectively. The SNonce and ANonce
are fresh nonces chosen by agents SP and AP, respectively.
Therefore, the defination of nonce will be modified as:
datatype nonce = SN | SN1 | SNonce | ANonce
In addition, a new type will be defined for Msg1, Msg2,
Msg3 and Msg4. This type will be called Messages and
added as follows:
datatype Masseges = Msg1 |Msg2 |Msg3 |Msg4
Since the 4-way handshake uses the Message Integrity
Code and typed messages, we need to add two constructors
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for datatype msg. They can be defined in msg datatype:
datatype msg =Mag Masseges
|MIC msg key
Besides the type definitions, the analysis requires several
new actions to represent their behaviours during the
authentication process. The new three actions are added as
follows:
Discard :: agent→ msg → Formula
Block :: agent→ msg → Formula
RRcv :: agent→ msg → Formula
The Discard action represents the behaviour of an agent
when ignoring received message. The Block action represents
the behaviour of an agent when removing the message from
the network so that the recipient cannot receive the message.
The behaviour of an agent receiving the same message more
than once can be represented by the RRcv action.
Since new definitions and actions have been added into the
framework, it is necessary to introduce a set of new rules to
describe new properties:
Rule 1.1 : S |= RRcv A M ∧ (S ≺ t) ⇒ t |=
 (Discard A M)
This rule says that if an agent receives the same message
more than once, then the agent will always discard this
message.
Rule 1.2 : (S |= Rcv A M) ∧ (t |= Rcv A M) ⇒ (t |=
RRcv A M) ∧ (S ≺ t).
This rule says that if an agent receives a message at
moment S and receives the same message at moment t, then
the agent receives the message more than once.
Rule 1.3 : (S |= Rcv Spy M) ∧ (S |= Block Spy M) ⇒
∀X.(S |= (Neg (Rcv X M))).
The rule says that if the attacker receives a message and
blocks it, then other agents in the network cannot receive this
message.
Eavesdropping rule : (S |= Send A B M) ∧ (S ≺ t) ⇒
(t |= Rcv Spy M).
The eavesdropping rule says if agent A sends a message to
agent B then the attacker can eavesdrop this message.
C. 4-Way Handshake Model in Isabelle
Normally, a protocol is written in informal language as
shown in figure 1. In this part we will therefore formalise
the steps of the 4-way handshake as four formal formulas for
all honest agents as follows:
1) FHShake1 : S |= Send AP SP ({Agent AP,
{Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg1, Nonce (SN)}}}).
2) FHShake2 : (S |= Send AP SP ({Agent AP,
{Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg1, Nonce (SN)}}})) =⇒
t |= Send SP AP ({Agent SP, { Nonce SNonce,
{Mag Msg2, {Nonce (SN), MIC {Nonce SNonce,
{Mag Msg2, Nonce (SN)}} k}}}}) ∧ (S ≺ t).
3) FHShake3 : S |= Send SP AP ({Agent SP,
{ Nonce SNonce, {Mag Msg2, {Nonce (SN),
MIC {Nonce SNonce, {Mag Msg2, Nonce (SN)}}
k}}}}) ∧ (S ≺ t) =⇒ t |= Send AP SP
({Agent AP, {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3, {Nonce
(SN1),MIC {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3, Nonce
(SN1)}} k}}}}).
4) FHShake4 : S |= Send AP SP ({Agent AP,
{Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3, {Nonce (SN1),
MIC {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3,
Nonce (SN1)}} k}}}}) =⇒ t |= Send SPAP
({Agent SP, {Mag Msg4, {Nonce (SN1),
MIC {Mag Msg4, Nonce (SN1)} k}}}) ∧ (S ≺ t).
The access point will re-send message 1 and message 3
if it did not receive the reply during the per-defined time
interval. The access point will continue to re-send and, after
timeout, will de-authenticate the wireless device if there is no
reply from it. There are two rules for re-sending the message
1 and message 3, as described below:
ReplayMessage1 : S |= ¬(Rcv AP ({Agent SP,
{ Nonce SNonce, {Mag Msg2, {Nonce (SN),
MIC {Nonce SNonce, {Mag Msg2, Nonce (SN)}}
k}}}})) ∧ (S ≺ t) =⇒ S |= Send AP SP ({Agent AP,
{Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg1, Nonce (SN)}}}).
ReplayMessage3 : S |= ¬(Rcv SP ({Agent SP,
{Mag Msg4, {Nonce (SN1), MIC {Mag Msg4,
Nonce (SN1)} k}}})) ∧ (S ≺ t) =⇒ t |= Send AP SP
({Agent AP, {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3,
{Nonce (SN1), MIC {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3,
Nonce (SN1)}} k}}}}) ∧ (t ≺ outtime) ∧
(intervaltime ≺ t).
The attacker has the ability to block any messages over
the network. So if any agent sends a message, the attacker
can block it and the recipient will not be able to receive it.
The rule for blocking message 4 can be represented in the
framework as follows:
BlockMessage4 : S |= Send SP AP ({Agent SP,
{Mag Msg4, {Nonce (SN1), MIC {Mag Msg4,
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Nonce (SN1)} k}}}) =⇒ S |= Block Spy ({Agent SP,
{Mag Msg4, {Nonce (SN1), MIC {Mag Msg4,
Nonce (SN1)} k}}}).
D. Proving Basic Properties
The first basic property is discarding the received messages.
The reason for an agent discarding a received message is
because the same message is received more than once. So
for security reasons the agent should discard the duplicate
copies of a message. The first property says that when agent
A sends a message to agent B more than once, then agent B
will always discard the message:
lemma DiscardReceivedMessage : (S |= Send A B M) ∧
(S ∧ t) =⇒ (t |=  (Discard B M))
apply (rule Rule 1.1)
apply (rule Rule 1.2)
apply (rule conjI)
apply (rule Rule 8)
apply (auto)
apply (rule Rule 8)
apply (auto)
done.
The second basic property is a special case of the blocked
message 4 by the attacker. This property says that when the
wireless device sends message 4, then the message may not
be received by the access point if it is blocked by the attacker.
lemma NotReceivedMessage4FromSender :
S |= Send SPAP ({Agent SP, {Mag Msg4, {Nonce
(SN1), MIC {Mag Msg4, Nonce (SN1)} k}}})
∧ (S ≺ t) =⇒ S |= ¬(Rcv AP ({Agent SP, {Mag Msg4,
{Nonce (SN1), MIC {Mag Msg4, Nonce (SN1)} k}}}))
apply(rule allE)
apply(rule Rule 1.3)
apply(auto)
apply(rule Eavesdropping rule)
apply (auto)
apply (rule BlockMessage4)
apply (auto)
done.
IV. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK ON THE PROTOCOL
In a DoS attack, the adversary prevents or inhibits protocols
from completing successfully. Simply speaking, it involves
disabling or preventing servers who are required to interact
with participants. Most protocols have the potential to be
attacked by DoS; however, the design of a protocol could
improve prevention, or make such attacks more unlikely [13].
It is impossible to fully protect protocols against DoS attacks.
A. DoS Attack on the 4-way Handshake
The sequence number (sn) is a technique used to prevent
reply attacks in the 4-way handshake. sn is a counter set to
0 when establishing PMK then incremented with successive
messages. The wireless device and the access point assume
that they have the same sn value before running the 4-way
handshake. During running the 4-way handshake the wireless
device should update the sn value when receiving the message
3, while the access point should update the sn value after
receiving the message 4 as shown in figure 1. As a result, at
the end of the 4-way handshake we assume that they will have
the same sn value. If the wireless device and access point have
different sn values at the end of the 4-way handshake they will
de-authenticate each other and cannot start future sessions.
 AA, ANonce, sn, Msg1 
SPA, SNonce, sn, Msg2, MIC PTK { SNonce,  
sn, Msg2} 
SPA, sn+1, Msg4, MIC PTK{ sn+1, Msg4} 
 AA, ANonce, sn+1, Msg3, MIC PTK { ANonce, 
sn+1, Msg3} 
Wireless devices Access point  
Derive (PTK) 
Derive (PTK) 
Verify MIC 
Verify ANonce 
Verify SNonce 
Verify MIC 
Install (PTK) 
Update sn 
Install (PTK) 
Update sn Attacker blocked message 
 AA, ANonce, sn+1, Msg3, MIC PTK { ANonce, 
sn+1, Msg3} 
Discards  
message 
Time out 
Discards  
message 
Deauthentication 
Figure 2. An Attack on the 4-way Handshake
The sn value can be a potential vulnerability in the 4-
way handshake. The wireless device and the access point will
continue running the 4-way handshake until time out without
knowing the attacker having blocked message 4. The access
point will re-send message 3 if it does not receive message 4
while the wireless device discards these messages as shown in
figure 2. This attack happens because each side has different
values of sn. A simple effort of the attacker, which blocks
message 4 once then lets the protocol run as usual, can destroy
the authentication between the wireless device and the access
point. It is easy for the attacker to detect message 4 over the
network because the 4-way handshake exchanges messages
without encryption.
One of the security properties in the 4-way handshake is
synchronising the installation of session keys. The wireless
device installs the session key after receiving message 3 and
the access point will install it after receiving message 4. In
Isabelle tool, a lemma shows that the wireless device will
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discard message 3 resent by the access point. As a result, if
the wireless device discards message 3, message 4 will not
be received by the access point and the access point cannot
install the session keys. The proving scripts of this lemma
are as follows:
lemma FindAttackinFourhandshack : S |= (Discard SP
({Agent AP, {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3,
{Nonce (SN1), MIC {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3,
Nonce (SN1)}} k}}}})).
apply(rule DiscardReceivedMessage)
apply(rule ReplayMessage3)
apply(rule NotReceivedMessage4FromSender)
apply(rule FHShake4)
apply(rule FHShake3)
apply(rule FHShake2)
apply(rule FHShake1)
done
PMK is important to reduce the authentication process costs
that occur every time PTK is established or updated. If PMK
has already existed they can run the 4-way handshake to obtain
new PTK for transferring the data over the network. If the
attacker can block message 4 then at the end of the 4-way
handshake, PMK will be invalid and 802.1X authentication
need to be run every time. As we know, the attacker has
the ability to block any messages over the network, therefore
it is easy for the attacker to block specifically message 4.
Consequently, the attacker can de-authenticate the access point
with all wireless devices wanting to connect during the 4-
way handshake phase. The DoS attack identified in this paper
is easy to implement over the network and it is difficult to
prevent. A number of attempts to prevent DoS proposed by
some researchers failed to defend against all DoS in the 4-way
handshake.
B. Preventing the DoS Attacks on Message 4
A number of researchers have discussed and proposed
solutions to avoid the DoS attack in the 4-way handshake.
He and Mitchell provided two solutions to avoid DoS attacks
on the wireless device side [14, 15]. In addition, Rango et
al. discussed the He and Mitchell solutions and introduced
two new solutions to prevent DoS attacks [16]. Unfortunately,
all these solutions are unsuitable to prevent the DoS attack
identified in this paper. Therefore, we are going to introduce
a new solution for this attack.
The sn value plays an important role in preventing replay
attacks. The access point usually checks the sn value of
received message corresponding to the outstanding message.
Whereas, the wireless point checks the sn value used before
with current PMK. Moreover, when the access point does not
received reply message during the timeout interval, it will keep
re-sending the message until time out. The resent message
has the same contents as the original message and is valid
from the point of view of the access point. The wireless
device will likely discard the resent message if it has seen
the original message, which is valid for the access point. So
there is a contradiction between using sn value and re-sending
the original message. In other words, the recipient will be
confused with the resent message and the original message
where both are valid.
In order to prevent discarding the valid messages by the
wireless device, the access point should update the sn value
immediately after sending the message. So, when the access
point wants to re-send the original message, a new sn value
will be used. The sn value makes the resent message different
from the original message and therefore the wireless device is
not going to discard the resent message. As shown in figure 3,
if the access point has not received message 4 during interval
time out, then message 3 will be resent with the new sn value.
As a result, the simple amendment will reduce the chance of
message 4 being attacked. Also, the wireless device is not
going to discard the valid messages.
 AA, ANonce, sn, Msg1 
SPA, SNonce, sn, Msg2, MIC PTK { SNonce,  
sn, Msg2} 
SPA, sn+1, Msg4, MIC PTK{ sn+1, Msg4} 
 AA, ANonce, sn+1, Msg3, MIC PTK { ANonce, 
sn+1, Msg3} 
Wireless devices Access point  
Derive (PTK) 
Derive (PTK) 
Verify MIC 
Verify ANonce 
Verify SNonce 
Verify MIC 
Install (PTK) 
Update sn 
Install (PTK) 
Update sn 
Update sn 
Figure 3. Prove the Updated 4-Way Handshake
C. Proving the Fix Protocol Using Isabelle
In order to prove that the DoS attack on the 4-way hand-
shake can be prevented the replay message 3 should be
modified according to the proposed solution. Suppose that
the access point should rename the sn1 value to become sn
after sending message 3. Meanwhile, the updated sn value will
become sn1. So, the replayed message 3 will be changed every
time it is re-sent; therefore, it is not going to be discarded by
the wireless device. The replayed message 3 can be re-write
as follows:
ReplayMessage3New : S |= ¬(Rcv SP ({Agent SP,
{Mag Msg4, {Nonce (SN), MIC {Mag Msg4,
Nonce (SN)} k}}})) ∧ (S ≺ t) =⇒ t |= Send AP SP
({Agent AP, {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3,
{Nonce (SN1), MIC {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3,
Nonce (SN1)}} k}}}}) ∧ (t ≺ outtime) ∧
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(intervaltime ≺ t).
The following script shows that the access point will keep
sending the message 3 until receiving message 4 or the finish
time of the session. Whereas, the wireless device is not going
to discard the re-sent message 3 because it is not the same as
the previous message 3 which has been received.
FixDoSAttack : t |= Send AP SP
({Agent AP, {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3,
{Nonce (SN1), MIC {Nonce ANonce, {Mag Msg3,
Nonce (SN1)}} k}}}}) ∧ (t ≺ outtime) ∧
(intervaltime ≺ t)
apply(rule ReplayMessage3New)
apply(rule NotReceivedMessage4FromSender)
apply(rule FHShake4)
apply(rule FHShake3)
apply(rule FHShake2)
apply(rule FHShake1)
done
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The 4-way handshake phase in the IEEE 802.11i standard
has been analysed and a DoS attack has been identified.
Isabelle tool has been used to implement the linear tempo-
ral logic framework. The adjustment of the framework, the
modelling of the protocol and the proving of basic properties
have been used for analysing the 4-way handshake. More
importantly, a new effective DoS attack by blocking message
4 has been identified and analysed.
The protocol uses the sn value to avoid replay attacks in the
4-way handshake. However, the analysis has shown that the sn
value will be a flaw if message 4 is not received by the access
point. Non-receipt of message 4 can be caused by the attacker
or anything else. In this case, the authentication between the
wireless device and the access point will fail. Simply updating
the sn value after sending message 3 can prevent the attack.
Moreover, it is possible for the access point to obtain the reply
message for message 3.
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